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Nongovernmental Organizations and Muslim Queer 
Communities in the Netherlands 
 
Jim Hoppe 
 
The Netherlands offers a particularly interesting case study of what it means to 
incorporate a changing sense of values toward sexual freedom while maintaining a strong 
sense of national culture and context. During the height of the Dutch system known as  
“Pillarization,” daily life was defined by religion. Every town and village not only 
consisted of Protestant and Catholic churches, but also separate schools, butchers, 
grocers, doctors, and shops, in a sort of “separate but equal” society that did not require 
much interaction between people perceived as different. 
   The sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s had a significant effect on Dutch society, 
resulting in a retreat from the domination of religion and a rethinking of various societal 
norms. Gay and lesbian Dutch in particular benefited as Dutch society became more 
accepting of different expressions of sexuality, and in 2001, the Netherlands became the 
first country to allow same-gender marriage. 
   The introduction of a significant Muslim community to the Netherlands has once again 
challenged the status quo and caused many Dutch to rethink their commitment to the 
concept of multiculturalism. Muslim immigrant communities have grown significantly in 
size. More than one million of the twelve million Dutch identify as Muslim, but have 
remained largely isolated from their white Dutch neighbors. Instead of becoming 
increasingly influenced by the Dutch way of life, most Muslim communities have 
become more conservative with each succeeding generation. The political and cultural 
reactions that have followed question the often-touted notion of Dutch tolerance for 
difference. As gay and lesbian communities emerge within the transplanted Muslim 
communities, it remains to be seen if existing organizational structures will be adequate 
to support their growth and development. Finally, in a world where we all just want to get 
along, it begs the question of what makes us the same and different. Is a shared sexual 
orientation enough to forge bonds of community? 
 
***** 
 
 Non-Governmental Organizations, or NGOs, have played an important role in 
establishing a sense of place for the gay and lesbian community. The Cultuur en 
Ontspanningscentrum (Center for Culture and Leisure), or COC, was founded in 1946 
and is the oldest Dutch NGO focusing on lesbian and gay issues. In fact, it claims to be 
the oldest organization of its type in the world. The rather unique name was created to 
deflect the casual observer from the true purpose of the organization.1 The roots of the 
queer organization go deeper, and it is likely that the COC had its foundation in the 
Dutch chapter of the Scientific Humanitarian Committee (SHC). The SHC was founded 
in 1911 in protest to the passage of a series of laws, “Article 248bis,” designed to repress 
homosexuality. The SHC functioned until World War II and the Nazi occupation, and 
then rebounded quickly and was re-formed as the COC after the war.2 
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It wasn’t until 1964 that the name was altered to Nederlandse Vereniging voor 
Homofielen COC (Dutch Association for Homophiles COC), providing more 
transparency to the role of the organization. 
   During the1950s and 1960s, the COC played a significant role in fostering greater 
acceptance of gay and lesbian events and activities by the general population. By the 
1970s, most large cities hosted gay and lesbian bars and visibly open social activities. 
Formal recognition by the government did not happen until 1974, when the name 
changed formally to Nederlandse Vereniging voor Integratie van Homoseksualiteit COC 
(Dutch Association for Integration of Homosexuality COC). With government 
recognition came funding for projects and access to government agencies. The 
government began to rely on COC for the collection of data and advice about providing 
services to gay and lesbian citizens.3  
   The COC website notes four “spear heads” of COC work: young people and education, 
care for elders, the multicultural society, and international solidarity.4 Given these 
priorities, and the strong current of discussion about Muslim immigration and the 
treatment of homosexuals by Muslims, one might assume the COC to be very active in 
these endeavors. Despite eleven emails over six months, no individual at the COC ever 
responded to my questions about COC policies or activities designed to facilitate the 
integration of Dutch Muslim queers, or to address the issue of tensions surrounding 
immigrant populations. During an impromptu visit to the COC federal offices in 
Amsterdam, the staff was not able to provide information on—or even seem to have 
knowledge of—work being done by the COC to address questions and issues exacerbated 
by the immigration debate. All questions were directed to a single individual, who did not 
respond to requests for information.5 
   In interviews with members of other LGBT activists, criticism of COC was apparent. 
The organization is respected for its past, but seems to be “written off” as a group that has 
real influence over contemporary Dutch queer society. COC is credited, for example, 
with organizing a major seminar challenging governmental perspectives on marriage in 
1990, and it remained involved in the debate until the passage of laws guaranteeing equal 
marriage rights.6 A dispute over management in 2004, however, led to significant 
resignations of senior leadership and the establishment of a rival organization, Homo 
LesBische Federatie Nederland. To be fair, staff at COC seems actively engaged in a 
variety of issues, but focuses primarily on coordination of activities, government 
relations, and maintaining a network of smaller, but more active, regional offices. 
   There is no shortage of LGBT NGOs in the Netherlands, at least eighty of which are 
active in some significant way. These tend to be smaller, more focused organizations, 
which garner most of the public, or at least activist, attention. Many have a relatively 
short life cycle, in part because of their high degree of specialization or their focus on 
smaller, more targeted issues.7 
 
***** 
 
Immigration, particularly by Muslims, is changing the face of modern-day Europe. Many 
European countries are experiencing waves of populist xenophobia and new political 
parties with anti-immigration platforms are being created. While this is not surprising in 
many parts of the continent, one might not expect that such a party would garner 20 
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percent of the vote in the tolerant Holland of the current day. While most of the negative 
political discussion focuses on Muslims in general, concern is largely directed at the two 
largest groups: Moroccans and Turks. Immigrants, who came in a first wave to fill 
unwanted jobs were later allowed to bring family members to join them. As subsequent 
generations have been born in the Netherlands, most Muslims remain concentrated in the 
larger cities, with little interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim Dutch or even 
within various immigrant communities. Dutch frustration with Muslim immigrants is 
significant, and seems primarily motivated by fear of crime. Muslim failure to adopt 
Dutch attitudes about the treatment of women and acceptance of homosexuals 
exacerbates the situation. It highlights a growing, yet often unspoken, fear that Muslim 
society might be incompatible with the Dutch way of life.8 Dutch scholar Laurens Buijis 
notes: 
 
[T]he cultural divide between Dutch versus Moroccan and Turkish people 
around issues related to homosexuality has been exacerbated in recent 
years by a political climate in the Netherlands in which Dutch natives have 
attempted to bring about the ‘sexularization’ of Muslim immigrants. 
‘Sexularization’ describes the manner in which some members of 
mainstream Dutch society have tried to force immigrants to assimilate to 
Dutch secular attitudes that are permissive of homosexuality.9  
 
The distinction in attitudes about and definitions of homosexuality is extensive. The 
typical white Dutch person would likely identify homosexuality as an inherent trait 
someone is born with, while the typical Muslim immigrant would identify it as choice 
made by the individual. Even among immigrant men who engage in same-sex sexual 
relations there is a resistance to accepting the label of gay or homosexual.10 
   Perhaps it should be no surprise, given the progressive stance most Dutch take on 
homosexuality, that this has become one of the most visible sources of concern with the 
Muslim community. Right-wing politicians like Geert Wilders have highlighted Muslim 
violence toward gays (both verbal and physical) as evidence that Muslim society is 
incompatible with Dutch values. This adoption of a pro-Gay Rights stance as a political 
wedge issue seems to be a uniquely Dutch phenomenon.  
   As troubling as the relationship between Muslims and homosexuals is in the 
Netherlands, on a larger European level, it takes a back seat to issues faced in other 
countries. At the Brussels office of the International Gay and Lesbian Association-Europe 
(ILGA-Europe) attention is primarily focused on fighting the type of homophobia that 
would be more recognizable in the United States. In reaction to the increased tolerance 
toward sexual minorities, conservative Christian religious groups have become more 
professionalized and powerful, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. In that 
context, tensions between Islam and homosexuality do not present as great a concern to 
others as they do in the Netherlands.11 The struggle to find space for peaceful coexistence 
between Muslims and homosexuals may be primarily a Dutch issue, but the lessons 
learned will undoubtedly influence the rest of the Western world. 
 
***** 
 
122 
 
There are several NGOs organized either for or by gay and lesbian Muslims operating in 
the Netherlands. The pioneering gay Muslim organization in the Netherlands was the 
Yoesuf Foundation, founded in 1992 by Syrian immigrant Omar Nahas. Mr. Nahas is 
described as a strong intellectual with an intelligent knack for nudging and pushing the 
dominant Muslim community in its thinking about homosexuality.12 At its height, Yoesuf 
had a staff of three and a volunteer board of fourteen. The group’s focus was geared more 
toward the collection and dissemination of information than providing a social outlet.13 
The impact of Yoesuf was considerable, in particular because of its influence on the 
Dutch government. The name Yoesuf was specifically chosen because of its religious 
connotations. The historical Yoesuf was a man noted in the Qur’an as being extremely 
beautiful, but never having tested the love of a woman. As an academic, Dr. Nahas 
studied and published on Islam, homosexuality, and Western culture. His personal 
knowledge gave him the ability to formulate discussion based on scientific views and the 
Qur’an, quoting the teachings of Mohamed whenever possible.14 
   By capitalizing on connections in the white Dutch community, Yoesuf became a 
positive influence, providing education for social workers and members of government 
ministries. Within the Muslim community, Yoesuf posed the question of whether or not it 
was possible to combine a Muslim and a queer outlook. Homosexuality is a taboo subject 
in Muslim society. Not merely rejected, it is typically not even discussed. Yoesuf and 
many successive organizations have striven to create a positive term to be used to 
describe homosexuality in the Muslim community, since all of the terms currently used 
have negative connotations. Simply by bringing the question into the public forum, 
Yoesuf helped advance the cause. The response in the Muslim community was not 
always positive, but even bringing the topic into the acceptable range allowed individuals 
to begin forming opinions that could be openly discussed. Perhaps advances such as this 
contribute to noted Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan’s point that while homosexuality 
could be tolerated by Muslims, it would just never be accepted as legitimate. 15 This 
language is amazingly close to the “hate the sin, love the sinner” concept promulgated by 
many Christian denominations. 
   In particular, the Yoesuf Foundation caught the attention of the Dutch Minister for 
Health and Education, who frequently held out the Foundation as a positive example and 
provided funding and government support.16 Dr. Nahas left the Netherlands to pursue a 
Ph.D. in Belgium in 2002, and the Yoesuf Foundation began to flounder. Because of the 
government investment and desire to showcase a foundation of and for Muslim queers, 
Yoesuf lingered until 2008, when it officially became defunct. 
   After placing so much attention on Yoesuf, its demise left the Dutch government in 
need of a strong organization dedicated to advancing a dialogue. Other existing groups, 
such as Secret Garden, or Stichting Nafar, were more inwardly focused and social, so the 
government facilitated the new organization, Malaica. Once again, the naming of the 
group was intentional.  The new group might have liked to continue using the Yoesuf 
label  (the old Yoesuf web address automatically redirects the user to the Malaica 
website), but it feared a backlash from within the Muslim community. Many Muslim 
leaders had long argued that the use of the name Yoesuf was disrespectful. With the 
organization no longer headed by a Muslim or a scholar, it did not seem prudent to 
continue its use. The new term, Malaica, is both an African and Arab word, meaning 
guardian angel. While it is not directly related to the Qur’an, it is still considered a holy 
123 
 
word. The organization hopes to convey a connection to religion that will speak to 
members of the immigrant community. 
   In its formation Malaica is more visibly influenced by its government origins. The 
organization is managed by a Board, not all of whom are Muslim or identify as LGBT. 
By design, Malaica is set up to be bi-cultural in orientation, and promote small group 
dialogue sessions that hope to continue a process of establishing common ground. The 
initial goals of Malaica are fairly restrained. With a grant of 4,500,000 euros for a four-
year period, the organization is expected to produce eleven dialogues of twelve to 
eighteen participants each per year. Each dialogue has a budget of approximately 6,000 
euros. Malaica works within the networks of COC and other NGOs, including 
organizations that are not organized specifically around homosexual activism, to find the 
audience for these dialogues. Conscious of its status as a newcomer, the leaders of 
Malaica are careful not to duplicate existing services or try to step into areas they know to 
be served well by existing groups. This group in particular seems to understand that the 
native Dutch need just as many opportunities for education and understanding as the 
immigrant Muslims. Each dialogue session hopes to contain participants from a variety of 
ethnic backgrounds and sexual orientations. Many native Dutch are unaware of the 
struggles within the Muslim immigrant communities, and feel uncertain about how best 
to even begin a conversation.  The group’s treasurer, Mattias Duyves, notes that, “for 
many young Muslims, homosexuality is not their first problem.  The idea of virginity (or 
lack thereof), the acceptable roles of men and women and violence are much more 
prevalent and must be addressed first before their minds can even begin to comprehend 
what it means to be queer.” What Malaica shares most with other NGOs in this category 
is a desire to challenge the secrecy and silence that many ethnic groups use as a weapon 
to prevent discussion, which perpetuates cycles of violence and misunderstanding. As 
Malaica continues to develop as an organization, it will likely venture into other 
programmatic areas, including the use of social media, the development of educational 
programs in schools, and providing educational exhibitions around the country. The 
success of Malaica is yet to be determined. Its goals are laudible, but its artificial creation 
and government sponsorship may prevent it from being seen as legitimate. 
   Habibi Anna opened in the mid-1990s as the first and still only café and bar in 
Amsterdam catering to Arab and Muslim gays, lesbians, and transsexuals. It has 
developed into a community center for gay and lesbian Muslims and Arabs and recently 
moved to a larger space to accommodate a growing clientele. Early in its history Habibi 
Anna even sponsored a float in the annual Amsterdam canal parade, featuring Muslim 
boys and men in the traditional veiled costumes of female dancers. Participation in Pride 
and the accompanying associations of being “out and proud” created conflict in the 
community and participation has changed in the ensuing years. The bar is well known 
and listed in the various publications for gay and lesbian visitors. It is located in a 
pleasant neighborhood within the center ring of Amsterdam, but not on a street 
containing many other gay- and lesbian-oriented businesses. A visit to Habibi Anna on a 
Friday night illustrates the distinctions in how homosexuality and same-sex relationships 
are lived in the Muslim community. The bar is a lively, friendly place, where everyone 
seems to know or at least be comfortable with each other. The visual distinction between 
generations, however, is immediately noticeable. Older patrons, dressed more 
conservatively, would hardly stand out from any other Muslim man in the city. Many of 
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them are married and live traditional lives as far as anyone else in the community is 
concerned, honoring the need for discretion in perhaps the same way that they would if 
they remained in Morocco or Turkey. While there is no strong concept of homosexuality 
in many Muslim countries, the idea of same-sex relationships is a discretely 
acknowledged part of the social structure.17 Younger patrons, however, were dressed 
much more provocatively, similar to young men in other Amsterdam gay bars. They were 
also more overtly sexual in their actions, holding hands and dancing. It was impossible to 
tell their level of openness in the world outside the bar, but the activity inside would 
suggest that perhaps the next generation of young Muslim queers could adopt a more 
Western philosophy about living their life as a gay person. There were women in the bar, 
but they seemed to be there to be with their male friends and not because they identified 
as lesbian or worked seeking sex with women.18 In general, most of the discussion on 
homosexuality within the Muslim community seems focused on men, perhaps mimicking 
the conflicts with gender roles and perceived sexism they are associated with. 
   In 1994, Emir Belautoui founded Secret Garden, in conjunction with the COC, as a 
foundation for LGBT Muslims. Belatoui had been a fashion designer in his native Algeria 
prior to seeking asylum in the Netherlands. Secret Garden slowly but steadily grew as a 
social space for gay Muslim men until a dispute in 2001 with the COC administration left 
Secret Garden without a home, and the organization was dormant for several years. In 
2008, Secret Garden reappeared as an independent organization and has seen steady 
growth since then.19 
   The Secret Garden website outlines its goal to increase dialogue on the subject of 
homosexuality within immigrant communities as well as provide a safe place for LGBT 
Muslims to meet and increase their sense of self worth.20 In many ways, Secret Garden 
works hard to protect the privacy of its members, and is cautious about granting requests 
for interviews or meetings. At the same time, they are among the most visible of the 
LGBT Muslim organizations. In July of 2010, the group signed a lease for office space in 
the notable Amsterdam landmark Montelbaanstoren, an iconic tower on a canal in the 
center city. The Amsterdam city council provided subsidized rent in an effort to give the 
organization a home in a visible center city location.21 The Secret Garden website 
features a gallery section with photographs of major events. The Secret Garden is unique 
in having its own separate, not to mention highly visible, location. All signs point to 
Secret Garden becoming a more permanent fixture of the LGBT community in 
Amsterdam. 
   Secret Garden also takes a more visible stand in the promotion of safer sex and HIV 
awareness.  Many bars and coffee shops distribute Secret Garden pamphlets in Arabic on 
HIV and safer sex and condoms. The red AIDS awareness ribbon is adorned with the 
Arabic phrase, “If you have sex, do it safe.”22 In a 2009 interview published in the 
Amsterdam newspaper de Telegraaf, Balatoui openly challenged the Muslim community 
to start thinking differently about gay and lesbian issues, stating, “Homosexual youth 
should be able to speak about their inclinations with their parents…Many religions have 
the tendency to ban homosexuality,” he says, “but nowhere, neither in the Koran, does it 
say that love between people of the same sex is forbidden.  That taboo is cultural, but 
should be changed.” Balatoui contends that he does not seek confrontation with imams, 
for example. “We don't want to shock or provoke. In this way we won't reach our goal, 
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but we do enter into talks. A first step should then be that we learn to accept each 
other.”23 
   The third predominantly LBGT Muslim NGO in Amsterdam is Stichting Nafar, 
founded by Chafik Gadir. Gadir was born in Morocco but later moved to the Netherlands 
with his family at the age of 16. He was motivated to create Stichting Nafar by the 
experience of losing close friends to AIDs and by inflammatory remarks by Sheikh 
Khalil el-Moumni, the Rotterdam imam who was taken to court in 2001 (but acquitted) 
for his disparaging remarks against homosexuals. The organization promotes three main 
goals: hulpverlening (relief), or providing support for members of the community; 
voorlichting (education), or raising awareness about issues related to North Africans and 
same-sex attraction; and ambitie (ambition), or moving North African youth with 
homosexual feelings forward as a community.24 
   Stichting Nafar also started small and with assistance and space provided by COC. Five 
North African boys attended the first Nafar dance at the COC-Amsterdam bar, but two 
years later events would draw as many as seventy. The organization has grown to 
sponsoring theme parties in some of Amsterdam’s most prominent venues.25 Nafar 
recognizes the need to provide Moroccan and other North African youths with a space 
where they can come to terms with their sexuality in the context of their cultural and 
religious upbringing. In an April 2010 interview with the Dutch magazine Gay & Night, 
Gadir stated, “In Morocco, your identity is determined by your family first, and only then 
by your nationality or your sexual orientation. There is no mention of possible feelings 
for someone of the same sex because, according to Islam, homosexuality does not 
exist.”26 
   Gadir underscores the strength of family identity within the immigrant community and 
the challenges that come with rebelling against it in any way. Gadir is open to his family 
about his own sexuality, but understands their need for him to maintain a level of 
discretion.27 Negative perceptions of Moroccan youth in the Netherlands are widespread 
and it is not difficult to find someone who claims first- or second-hand knowledge of 
violence at the hands of one of the young male members of this community. Gay men in 
particular are concerned about the rise in violence against them perpetrated by Moroccan 
immigrants. Newspapers and magazines frequently reference this concern and offer 
reports of attacks. Visitors to Amsterdam gay clubs are warned to stay vigilant against 
attacks and be cautious of being overtly sexual or affectionate with members of the same 
gender in public. Gadir offered his own philosophy about this violence, stating: 
  
There is something else going on. Those guys are often consciously gay 
cruising areas around, looking for victims. They are jealous when two gay 
men openly and happily see walking around. I believe this is because they 
often struggle with their own homosexual feelings. But they know that 
they, when they talk about home, their father, brothers or friends get a 
spanking. This fear makes them aggressive.28 
 
   Nafar, then, provides that needed opportunity for North African boys struggling with 
homosexual feelings to challenge cultural norms and redefine what it means to be gay, or 
at least to have homosexual feelings. The hope is that over time this will contribute to the 
development of a sense of positive self-esteem among young same-sex-attracted North 
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African boys. Furthermore, this may propel a positive discussion of homosexuality within 
Muslim families and in Muslim culture. 
 
***** 
 
The official COC is indeed quite difficult to engage, but for all the disparagement by 
activists, it does seem stronger and more vibrant than it is given credit. Outside of 
Amsterdam, the local chapters are, by and large, still active and in many smaller cities the 
local COC chapter remains the most identifiable homosexual organization. Gay media 
outlets in the Netherlands frequently cite COC, especially as a source of news items from 
rural areas and small towns. Almost all of the Muslim-oriented LGBT NGOs in 
Amsterdam began with COC support, using meeting space and benefitting from COC’s 
large network of resources and contacts. It is likely that many of the other mid- to large-
size LGBT NGOs arose in similar fashion. Perhaps the strong COC history and network 
is the reason that so many LGBT NGOs flourish in the Netherlands. After homosexuals 
in the the Netherlands were granted the right to marry in 2001 and adopt children in 
2004, there no longer seemed to be a great “common enemy” against which the 
community could unite. Many members of the LGBT community turned their attention to 
other issues and pursuits, relying on the COC for assistance collecting data, distributing 
funds, or providing meeting space. It is understandable that the COC may rely on these 
newer, Muslim-oriented NGOs to fulfill the needs of Muslim gays, but given the role 
Muslim-gay relations play in contemporay Dutch politics, it would seem wise for the 
COC to step up their visibility and activity around these issues. 
   One of several characteristics that many of the Muslim-oriented LGBT NGOs have in 
common is their reliance on a single charasmatic leader. The idolization of charismatic 
Muslim gay men seems to be something of a phenomenon in the Netherlands.29 A recent 
issue of the major Dutch publication L’Homo (The Gay) features Orhan Bucakli, a 
prominent model and socialite within the gay community. Part of the article addresses the 
attention Bucakli receives when in public, and how he has become somewhat of a cult 
figure within the gay community. Bucakli has capitalized on his notoriety to organize 
parties for queer Turks and Moroccans.30 Each of the  grassroot LGBT NGOs has an 
iconic founder, and the success of the organization has been dependent on the success of 
the leader. When the leader leaves the scene, as when Omar Nahas left for Belgium, the 
organization folds. Secret Garden may prove to be the exception. While still led by 
founder Emil Belatoui, the organization is taking steps to be more public and open, 
providing more opportunities for members to get involved and take on leadership roles. 
   A second theme is more specific and reflects the personal stories of the leaders of these 
organizations. Most of the gay Muslim men in the leadership roles have come to the 
Netherlands as asylum seekers, meaning they left their country of origin specifically to 
emigrate to the Netherlands.31 Forced to find and develop new connections upon their 
arrival in the Netherlands, they frequently found it easier to connect to the white Dutch 
queer community than to their native immigrant communities. Particularly if they left 
their country of origin as a result of oppression, they are justfiably hesitant to affiliate 
with a new community that is likely even more conservative than the one left behind. As 
a result, each man is less connected to, and therefore less dependent upon, the strong, 
isolating, family-centered nature of the immigrant communities. 
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   If not asylum seekers, it is more likely that openly gay Muslim men have made a more 
formal break with their families.32 Orhan Bucakli was born in the Netherlands to Turkish 
parents and married at age 18 to a bride brought to the Netherlands from Turkey. He 
ultimately left her and his children to pursue life within the gay community in 
Amsterdam. An exception to this pattern might be Chafik Gadir, the director of the Nafar, 
who was born in Morocco but emigrated. At one point in a 2001 interview with Daniel 
Woznica, Gadir noted that he is “out” to his family, but they are accepting only as long as 
he maintains a certain level of discretion. The fact that several years earlier Gadir’s 
picture appeared alongside an article about Nafar in the major Dutch newspaper Trouw 
seems far from discrete, however. It might be that immigrant communities are so isolated 
the chance of his picture being noticed  and causing concern for his parents is slim. The 
number of men attending NAFAR parties or patronizing Habibi Ana might mean that 
younger gay Muslims are better able to manage the balancing act required to be part of 
both the Muslim and homosexual worlds. 
   The conflict between “Eastern” and “Western” ways of defining what it means to be 
homosexual was prevalent in this process. Western European expectations of being “out 
and proud” were in part formulated as a result of the Sexual Revolution and accompanied 
a separation by mainstream society from the prior dominant Christian paradigms. The 
Sexual Revolution, however, missed the majority of the Muslim world. The ever-
increasing number of Muslims in Western Europe is pushing Muslim cultural thinking to 
catch up. If Western notions are not going to be adopted, how will mainstream Muslim 
society in Europe discuss this formerly taboo subject? Within the limited discussion on 
homosexuality among Muslim scholars there is disagreement on what it means to be, or 
not be, homosexual and how Muslims might be inclined to define same-sex activity 
differently than Westerners.33 Perhaps that explains why so many Muslim gays prefer the 
relative comfort of organizations like Secret Garden or Nafar.  
   Distinctions within Muslim communities play a role as well. The gay Muslim parties 
organized by Bucakli have separate rooms for Moroccans and Turks.34 Organizations and 
activities such as these welcome Muslim men as they are. They place no expectation that 
the men leave their family or their religion in order to be successfully “out” or even try to 
determine who they are. Stifling communities and poor self-esteem keep many gay 
Muslim men isolated and afraid. The discovery that one is not alone can help build self-
esteem, which over time creates a desire to build allies and create community.35 The 
desire by many Dutch to have an open conversation with Muslim immigrants about 
sexuality and homosexuality is at present more than most immigrants are able to digest. 
Perhaps the efforts of Malaica to encourage dialogue around the taboo topics of violence 
and gender relations need to occur first to allow a path for discussions on sexuality. 
   It is tempting to take the rise of such divisive politicians as Geert Wilders as a sign that 
there is no hope for a peaceful coexistence between Muslims and homosexuals in the 
Netherlands. The work—and success—of many LGBT NGOs suggests otherwise. To be 
certain, these are small strides, but as we know, babies must crawl before they can walk. 
The history of homosexual rights in the West demonstrates that society must first break 
the taboo on discussion before meaningful dialogue and perhaps change in attitudes can 
occur. By being visible and creating venues for conversation (even if the conversation is 
critical), the discussion of homosexuality in the Muslim community is entering a different 
phase. Activists are finding ways to discuss sexuality that fit the norms of Muslim 
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communties and are compatible with references to the Qur’an. This might not be 
recognizable or even preferrable to progressive white Dutch attitudes, but it is an 
advancement. Attitudes within Muslim communities about poor behavior by “Moroccan” 
youth might also be evolving. Parents are becoming more aware of the need to address 
violence by their children, which may by default lead to discusions about violence against 
homosexuals.36 
   Complete integration is perhaps not always the ideal outcome. Muslim homosexuals in 
the Netherlands are becoming increasingly recognized as part of the Muslim community, 
and not just part of the “them” of white Dutch society. Smaller Muslim immigrant 
communities, such as the Surinamise and Somali, already seem more comfortable with 
their place in Dutch society and in some ways more comfortable with the position of 
homosexuals in the Muslim world. In a conversation with an elder member of the Somali 
Community Center in The Hague, I asked what would happen if one of his children came 
out as a gay or lesbian. The man paused and put his hand on his forehead before saying, 
“I would not like it, but I would still love them. What else could I do?” More attention is 
being directed to the fact that moderate imams reference homosexuality in terms not all 
that different from the Pope or other Christian religious leaders. As organizations like 
Secret Garden continue to grow and become more visible, perhaps their efforts will serve 
as an influence on the white Dutch as well, challenging perceptions and stereotypes of 
what it means to be Muslim and Dutch. 
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